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Abstract 
 In this dissertation I address two topics concerning authoritarianism: (1) the role 
of self-report bias in the assessment of the correlates of authoritarianism, and (2) the 
question of whether authoritarianism is appropriately conceptualized as a personality 
trait. I addressed the first topic in Studies 1 and 2. Study 1 used two samples to highlight 
the role of the individual’s perceptions of trait desirability in predicting bias in that 
individual’s self-reports. The individual’s views of the desirability of a trait were shown 
to be an effective predictor of variance that remained in self-report for that trait after the 
variance shared with peer-reported and/or objectively-assessed levels of that trait have 
been removed, indicating that people were more prone to exaggerate their levels of a trait 
when they personally viewed that trait as desirable. In a direct comparison against 
socially desirable responding measures, which identify individuals who claim 
exaggerated levels of general patterns of traits, individual perceptions of the desirability 
of traits were found to predict equal or greater amounts of bias in self-report measures, 
depending on the trait.  
 As previous studies had reported that authoritarians scored highly on measures of 
socially desirable responding, Study 2 applied the concepts of Study 1 to identify whether 
and how authoritarians exaggerate trait levels in self-reports. I found that authoritarians 
and nonauthoritarians were prone to distinct patterns of exaggerations in self-reports, 
where these exaggerations were explained by the different views of trait desirability held 
by authoritarians versus nonauthoritarians. There is thus nothing about authoritarianism 
per se that was connected to a tendency to misrepresent one’s true trait levels; rather, its 
connection with exaggeration in self-reports derived from its association with perceptions 
of trait desirability. 
 In Study 3, I addressed recent challenges to the original “trait” conception of 
authoritarianism in a longitudinal twin study. I found that, consistent with the results 
observed for other personality traits, authoritarianism was highly stable over time, and 
this stability was influenced primarily by genetic factors. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 Inspired by the then-recent atrocities of World War II, Adorno and colleagues 
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) sought to identify the 
characteristics of those most likely to support authoritarian regimes. The conception of 
Adorno and colleagues (1950) reflected the psychoanalytic tradition then dominant in 
psychology and was relatively expansive, containing among its nine core elements 
characteristics as disparate as an inclination towards mysticism and an elevated interest in 
detecting and preventing sexual promiscuity. Of the many revisions offered to this 
construct in the decades since this seminal work, those offered by Altemeyer (1981; 
1988; 1996) were the most routinely employed by psychological researchers. In his 
conception of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Altemeyer (1981) discarded the 
psychoanalytic foundation of authoritarianism and retained only three of the features 
identified by Adorno et al. (1950), including conventionalism, a willingness to obey 
established authority, and a punitive attitude towards deviants. Efforts to develop the 
nomological network of authoritarianism and to understand the development of 
authoritarian attitudes have frequently focused on the connections between 
authoritarianism and broad-band personality inventories such as those assessing the Big 
Five. In this dissertation I addressed two questions that have been raised by this research. 
The first question, addressed in Studies 1 and 2, concerns the role of biased responding in 
this literature. The second, addressed in Study 3, concerns the conceptualization of 
authoritarianism; though originally conceived as a personality trait, recent work has 
argued it is more accurately viewed as a product of personality traits interacting with 
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worldviews and recent experiences, and thus more variable over time and circumstance 
(e.g. Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007, Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). 
Because the overwhelming majority of the research connecting authoritarianism 
to other personality traits (recently reviewed by Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) has relied 
exclusively on self-report assessments, the interpretation of results from these studies 
must be tempered by concern over the accuracy of the self-report measures. The need for 
such concern is highlighted by the large number of studies reporting positive associations 
between social desirability measures and a range of right-wing attitude measures, 
including various measures of political conservatism (Egan, 1989), traditionalism 
(Shaffer & Duckitt, 2013; Tellegen, 1978/1982), and authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998; 
Meston, C., Heiman, J., Trapnell, P. D., & Paulhus, D. L., 1998; Ray, 1979; Tsang & 
Rowatt, 2007). As will be discussed below in Study 1, social desirability measures have 
evolved and proliferated in the decades since their introduction, but Paulhus (2002) 
suggests that two primary themes can be found in these measures. The first concerns 
presenting oneself as a “saint” (with elevated levels of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, 
and Emotional Stability); the second, as a “superhero” (with elevated levels of 
Extraversion, Openness, and Emotional Stability). With respect to social attitudes, it is 
primarily measures of the former tendency that have been associated with measures such 
as RWA in the above-cited studies and elsewhere. Given that authoritarians tend to report 
high levels of Conscientiousness in self-report surveys (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), 
researchers might thus worry whether this association accurately represents personality 
differences between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.  
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At the same time, the use and interpretation of measures of socially desirable 
responding has been a source of controversy, as scores on these measures include true 
variance in traits such as the Big Five in addition to bias (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 
1996). Accordingly, the association of authoritarianism with measures of “saint-like” 
self-presentation may reflect true associations of authoritarianism with “saint-like” traits, 
a tendency to misrepresent levels of these traits, or both. To address this question, the use 
of independent criteria (and not just self-report) to assess personality traits is essential. As 
shown below, an examination of the association of Altemeyer’s RWA scale with both 
self- and peer-reports of Big Five traits pointed to a more complex picture than might be 
inferred simply by correlating measures of socially desirable responding with RWA and 
other attitude constructs. Specifically, while authoritarians in our sample were found to 
be particularly prone to overclaim levels of Conscientiousness, there are also traits which 
nonauthoritarians were particularly prone to overclaim. In seeking to understand these 
findings, I conducted the research presented in Study 1, which highlighted an aspect of 
biased responding largely overlooked in previous work. Specifically, I found that 
participants in two samples had particularly overclaimed those traits that they personally 
viewed as desirable. This is in contrast to socially desirable responding measures, which 
(as their name suggests) identify the tendency to claim high levels of those traits viewed 
positively by society at large. Study 2 applied this general finding to the domain of 
sociopolitical attitudes: attitude measures like RWA were associated with biased 
responding in personality, but these associations appeared to reflect attitude-based 
differences in views of trait desirability rather than any process specific to attitudes. That 
is, the reason those low and high in authoritarianism tended to overclaim different traits 
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was because they tended to value different traits; two individuals who held different 
sociopolitical views but comparable views of trait desirability might thus be expected to 
show similar patterns of overclaiming.  
 An additional question raised by recent research in authoritarianism and 
personality concerns the question of the appropriate conceptualization of 
authoritarianism. Early formulations of authoritarianism viewed the construct as a 
personality trait (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988), with Altemeyer arguing that 
“[t]he RWA scale is a personality test disguised as an attitude survey” (Altemeyer, 2009, 
p. 14). This attitudinal-phrasing has been the source of some significant controversy: for 
example, Jugert and Duckitt (p. 464, 2009) noted that “[i]t has been pointed out that the 
RWA items are statements of social attitudes and beliefs and that there is no evidence 
that they measure personality,” consistent with the conception expressed in Sibley and 
Duckitt (2008) that personality traits should be viewed as “purely behavioral 
dispositions” (p. 276). Because items assessing attitudes are present in the majority of 
broad-band personality measures, however, (see Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 
2002; Werner & Pervin, 1996) it may be that this aspect of the dispute simply reflects a 
lack of familiarity with personality measures on the part of those challenging the trait 
conception of authoritarianism.  
 Other challenges to the trait conception of authoritarianism have focused on 
whether authoritarianism functions similarly to other personality traits. For example, 
Sibley et al. (2007) argued that authoritarianism is too malleable to be considered a 
personality trait. Though critiques of the trait-conception of authoritarianism have often 
not explicitly connected their proposals to the ideas of personality theorists or provide 
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clear definitional boundaries between personality traits and other kinds of psychological 
constructs, critics of the trait-conception often appear to view authoritarianism along the 
lines of what McAdams and Pals (2006) labeled “characteristic adaptations.” In 
comparison to traits, characteristic adaptations are more responsive to cultural and 
environmental influence, more subject to change over time, and have effects on behavior 
that are more dependent on situational context. Critics of the trait conception of 
authoritarianism have often suggested authoritarianism is not a trait itself but instead 
reflects both stable personality traits as well as the extent to which an individual currently 
views the world as a safe versus a dangerous place, where the hypothesized influence of 
this supposedly fluctuating worldview is suggested to introduce a degree of mutability to 
authoritarianism that is inconsistent with a conceptualization of it as a personality trait 
(e.g. Sibley et al., 2007). In Study 3 I reviewed the conceptual issues involved in this 
challenge and explored the longitudinal stability of authoritarianism over a 15-year 
period in a sample of twins, comparing the stability for this trait and the biometric 
sources of this stability to that observed for undisputed personality traits. Consistent with 
the “trait” conception of authoritarianism, results from this study paralleled those 
observed in previous work for other personality traits. Importantly, while the observed 
stability for authoritarianism was as high as that reported in meta-analyses of other 
personality traits (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000), like them, it was also not perfect: the 
correlation between the two time points was .74, and corrections for attenuation due to 
measurement error only increased this value to .79. It thus may be that this debate derives 
primarily from an idiosyncratic conceptualization of personality among opponents of the 
trait conception of authoritarianism, as the requirement that traits be immutable (Sibley et 
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al., 2007; p. 358) and assessed without reference to attitudes does not appear to be met by 
any trait (Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; 
Werner & Pervin, 1996). 
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Chapter II: Idiographically Desirable Responding: Individual Differences in Perceived 
Trait Desirability Predict Overclaiming (Study 1) 
Objective  
Conventional measures of self-report bias implicitly assume consistent patterns of 
overclaiming across individuals. We contrast this with the effects of individual 
differences in views of trait desirability on overclaiming, which we label Idiographically 
Desirable Responding (IDR). 
Method 
We obtained self- and peer-reports of trait levels on mixed-sex samples of undergraduates 
(N=352) and middle-aged community members (N=541), with an additional 
performance-based assessment in the latter sample. 
Results  
Compared to conventional measures of bias, individual differences in trait desirability 
ratings identified an independent and comparatively large amount of the variance in 
overclaiming for personality and physical attractiveness. The importance of IDR was 
confirmed by the replication of these results for intelligence, for which both peer-ratings 
and performance data were available. Individuals differed in the extent to which they rely 
on IDR, with these differences indexed by the correlation between views of the 
desirability of a given trait and the extent to which one overclaimed that trait. Individuals 
who were more prone to overclaim in this fashion exhibited higher self-esteem as well as 
higher scores on questionnaire measures of socially desirable responding. 
Conclusion 
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 Overclaiming of traits resulted both from the patterns of biases identified by 
conventional overclaiming measures and from individual differences in perceptions of 
what traits are most desirable. 
 
II.1 Introduction 
 Self-report measures of personality have a number of theoretical and practical 
virtues (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007), and a substantial body of literature supports their 
predictive utility in both basic research and applied settings (e.g., Roberts et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, concerns over the vulnerability of these instruments to distortion have been 
raised for over a half-century (Edwards, 1957). A sizeable literature has developed to 
identify those who might provide biased self-reports, as well as the contexts that promote 
bias in these measures. In their survey of the various efforts to identify biased responding 
in self-report, Paulhus and John (1998) argued that existing measures typically capture 
one or another of two distinct patterns of distortion. “Egoistic bias” refers to the tendency 
to claim high social and intellectual status, whereas “moralistic bias” refers to the 
tendency to deny socially deviant impulses and behaviors. Instruments assessing each of 
these tendencies measure individual differences in the degree to which a person is prone 
to a given manner of response. An assumption implicit to these instruments is that, at 
least within each category of bias (i.e., egoistic or moralistic), the pattern of biased 
response – that is, the traits that people exaggerate – will be the same from one individual 
to the next. 
 This implicit assumption may obscure an alternative source of bias. The present 
study investigates the role of individual differences in perceptions of trait desirability in 
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producing bias in self-reported trait levels. Rather than expecting misrepresentation in 
self-report to follow only one of a limited set of patterns (egoistic or moralistic), we 
additionally expect individuals to self-report higher levels of traits to the extent that they 
view them as desirable. The conceptions of “desirable traits” operationalized in existing 
measures were derived from aggregations of individual opinions on traits (e.g., Jackson 
& Messick, 1962); this literature appropriately refers to its topic as “socially desirable 
responding” (SDR) because it is the average desirability of the trait in society that is 
thought to provide the motivation for distortion. Consistent with this terminology, we 
label the phenomenon studied here “idiographically desirable responding” (IDR) to 
indicate that it is each individual’s personal views of the relative desirability of traits that 
are expected to be an importantly distinct source of misrepresentation in their self-
reported personality.  
 While a vast, venerable, and growing literature explores SDR, investigations of 
anything resembling IDR have been much rarer. This may reflect a belief that few 
meaningful differences exist between individuals’ perceptions of the desirability of traits. 
This belief has some basis, as mean inter-rater correlations for ratings of trait desirability 
typically surpass .6 (e.g., Krueger, 1996). Nevertheless, Sinha and Krueger (1998) found 
indications of possible influence of desirability ratings on the overclaiming of a given 
trait, showing that individuals who rated a trait as more desirable than did others also 
tended to claim higher levels of that trait. This study provided an important first step 
toward examining IDR, but could not resolve the question of whether this association 
truly represented bias; their results are equally consistent with a tendency of individuals 
to rate as more desirable the traits they actually possess. That SDR measures have long 
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been shown to measure at least as much true variance as bias in self-rated traits (McCrae 
& Costa, 1983; Ones et al., 1996) highlights the challenges to interpreting any association 
between self-reported trait levels and any proposed method of identifying bias. What is 
needed to do so effectively is evidence from an external criterion.  
Borkenau, Zaltauskas, and Leising (2009) carried out the only study we know of 
to use an external criterion in an exploration of IDR. This study departed from most 
previous work on the topic in two ways. First, instead of assessing the relative desirability 
of traits, it assessed perceptions of the optimal level of traits. Second, it investigated how 
individual differences in these perceptions predicted distortions in self-reported 
personality. The optimal level of traits (e.g. talkativeness, suspiciousness) was assessed 
on a 6-point Likert-type scale by each subject, resulting in an idiographic index labeled 
the Perceived Optimal Trait Level (POTL). Significant associations observed between 
these ratings and peer-reported trait levels indicated that differences in views of optimal 
trait levels were, in fact, associated with differences in actual personality. However, 
ratings of optimal trait levels also predicted variance in self-report trait levels not shared 
with peer-report, indicating that POTL also represents a source of bias in self-report.  
 Borkenau et al.’s (2009) use of peer-reported personality levels as a criterion to 
indicate “true” trait levels is consistent with recommended practice in the field (Paulhus 
& John, 1998) and has considerable empirical and conceptual support (Connelly & Ones, 
2010). At the same time, self- and peer-reports of personality are consistently shown to 
provide mutual incremental improvement in predictive validity (Connelly & Ones, 2010) 
indicating that at least some of the variance not shared between self- and peer-report is 
reflective of true trait levels. Having established POTL as an indicator of true trait 
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variance, the results of Borkenau et al. (2009) leave open the possibility that some (or 
even all) of the variance found in self- but not peer-report that is shared with POTL was 
in fact true trait variance. For this reason, the use of additional measures of “true” trait 
levels would provide a more conclusive demonstration of the existence and import of 
IDR. While objective measures are infrequently used for traits such as extraversion and 
agreeableness, both SDR and IDR have obvious potential connections to attributes for 
which objective assessments are more widely employed, such as intelligence. Indeed, 
existing measures of SDR have already been shown to predict overclaiming of 
intelligence when compared to performance on an IQ test (Paulhus & John, 1998). The 
inclusion of such measures in addition to peer report would thus provide a more 
conclusive demonstration of IDR. For this reason, we included a performance test of 
intelligence in Sample 2. 
 To quantify the extent of overclaiming present in self-reports, Paulhus and John 
(1998) suggested the use of self-criterion residuals (SCR), in which bias is captured by 
the residual variance remaining after regressing a self-report measure on a criterion 
measure of the same variable. After the variance shared with the criterion has thereby 
been removed from the self-report, any variance due to biased responding is thought to 
remain in the residual. SCRs have been repeatedly used in studies of SDR measures 
(Paulhus et al., 2003; Pauls & Crost, 2003), and the relative effectiveness of SDR and 
IDR at identifying these residuals is therefore of interest. Further, such a comparison is 
needed to investigate the independence of SDR and IDR. The importance of IDR would 
be supported if it could predict variance in SCRs over and above measures of SDR.  
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Both SDR and IDR can be operationalized in several ways. A range of 
instruments assessing SDR have been developed in the past 50 years (Paulhus, 2002). 
With scales to assess both egoistic and moralistic bias, the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991) is among the most used in recent years. 
Procedures to assess IDR are less well established. The optimal-trait-level approach 
employed by Borkenau et al. (2009) has much to recommend it, including the important 
insight that the desirability of most personality traits is not a strictly linear function. 
However, this approach does not have the ability to compare differences in the degree of 
desirability of different traits: two traits may be matched perfectly in perceived optimal 
trait level but differ markedly in the desirability of attaining that level. As SDR measures 
were typically developed with an eye toward the relative desirability of a given trait (e.g., 
Edwards, 1953), an IDR index based on individual differences in the perceived 
desirability of a trait may be the most direct method of comparison between SDR and 
IDR.  
We have thus far stressed how individual differences in perceived trait desirability 
may lead to individual differences in which traits a given individual overclaims. We 
expect these effects to be evident among the population as a whole, with those who view 
a trait as particularly desirable the most likely to have overclaimed that trait. But there 
may also be individual differences in this tendency: that is, some individuals may be 
particularly prone to overclaim the traits they personally view as desirable.  
Differences of this nature are plausibly connected with several extant constructs. 
For example, those who are particularly prone to overclaim the traits they personally 
view as desirable (IDR) may also tend to overclaim traits viewed as desirable by society 
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at large (SDR). This would suggest a general willingness to overclaim desirable traits, 
and would be supported if high scorers on SDR measures were also more prone to IDR.1
 
 
Further, just as those high in SDR tend to exhibit high self-esteem (Mar, DeYoung, 
Higgins, & Peterson, 2006), individual differences in IDR may show the same 
relationship, as those with a positive view of themselves may be particularly prone to 
believe they have the traits they view as desirable.   
II.2 Sample 1 
We present results from two samples that show how individual differences in trait 
desirability connected both to true differences in personality as well as to bias in self-
reports. Sample 1 consisted of members of romantic couples who provided personality 
ratings both for themselves and their partner in addition to completing a measure of the 
desirability of those traits. We examined correlations between trait desirability ratings 
and partner ratings to test whether trait desirability is associated with accuracy in self-
report. To test whether trait desirability is associated with bias in self-report, we 
examined the correlations between trait desirability and SCRs obtained by regressing 
                                                          
1 The interactions between individual and societal perceptions of trait desirability are likely quite complex, 
with different effects in different individuals and in different contexts. For an illustration of the idea at its 
simplest, consider four traits: Trait A is viewed as neutral by both the individual and society, trait B is 
viewed as desirable by the individual but neutral by society, trait C as neutral by the individual but 
desirable by society, and trait D as desirable by both the individual and society. Those low in both IDR and 
SDR will report all traits accurately; those high in IDR but not SDR will overclaim A and B but report C 
and D accurately; those high in SDR but not IDR will overclaim C and D but report A and B accurately; 
those high in both SDR and IDR will report A accurately, overclaim D the most, and will overclaim B and 
C equally.  
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self-ratings on partner ratings. Individual differences in the tendency to be influenced by 
IDR were also examined.  
  
II.3 Method 
II.3.1 Participants  
We recruited 187 heterosexual couples via advertisements on the psychology 
department research website and flyers posted throughout the campus and surrounding 
neighborhood of a large public university. All recruitment materials specified that 
couples had to be at least 18 years of age and dating for a minimum of three months and a 
maximum of one year. Of the 176 couples to provide complete data, the average 
relationship length was 10.5 months (SD= 13.04, median = 7). The mean age of the 
women was 20.5 years (SD=4.28), and the mean age of the men was 21.46 years 
(SD=4.77). The majority of participants were Caucasian (83.8%), 11.4% were Asian, 
2.2% were Hispanic, less than 1% Black, and 4% other or declined to provide ethnicity. 
Ninety-five percent of participants reported dating their partner exclusively; 3 couples 
were engaged. Each participant was compensated with $25 or ten extra credit points to 
use toward a psychology course. Both partners of each couple independently completed 
online measures.  
II.3.2 Measures 
II.3.2.1 Personality 
 Personality (both self- and peer-ratings) was assessed using a shortened version of the 
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). The BFAS allows for assessment 
of personality traits both at the level of the Big Five and at the sublevel of the two aspects 
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within each domain. The shortened version of the scale used in this research included 
four items assessing each aspect of the Big Five instead of the full ten items, for a total of 
40 items. The four items were selected based on validity evidenced in multiple samples 
of undergraduate students previously collected. Each item was correlated with overall 
scores on the Big Five and aspects as measured by the full 100-item BFAS. Then, 
correlations between each possible four-item scale with overall scores on the full BFAS 
were calculated. The four-item scales that showed the highest correlations (rs = .82 to 
.94) with the full BFAS scales and evidenced the greatest reliability (αs = .64 to .81) were 
chosen. The short BFAS was repeated with different instructions in order to assess both 
ratings of one’s own personality (self ratings) and ratings of one’s partner’s personality 
(peer ratings). Participants rated each item in terms of how well the statement described 
the self or the partner using a 5-point scale on which 1 was labeled strongly disagree and 
5 was labeled strongly agree. 
II.3.2.2 Ideal Self 
The short BFAS was repeated with different instructions in order to assess one’s ideal 
personality. Instructions read:  
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not describe your current 
ideal self.  For example, do you agree that you ideally would seldom feel blue? 
Please fill in the number that best indicates the extent to which you agree or 
disagree that each statement reflects your ideal self. Be as honest as possible, but 
rely on your initial feeling and do not think too much about each item. 
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Participants rated each item in terms of how well the statement described the ideal self on 
a 5-point scale on which 1 was labeled strongly disagree and 5 was labeled strongly 
agree. A selection of 5 on “seldom feel blue” indicates that they strongly agree that their 
ideal self would seldom feel blue, and thus represents the desirability of this trait. 
Desirability ratings for each of the Big Five trait were then computed by taking the mean 
of each of the relevant ratings.  
II.3.3 Analysis 
 Two different self-criterion residuals (SCRs) were obtained using peer report as 
the criterion measure. The first assessed differences between participants in the extent to 
which they over- or under-claimed a single trait (e.g. Extraversion), relative to other 
participants in the sample. We label this SCR a “within-trait self-criterion residual” (WT-
SCR). These SCRs are an individual difference measure appropriate for comparisons 
across participants—for example, testing the association between the desirability of a trait 
and the extent of overstatement of that trait in the sample as a whole. WT-SCRs were 
obtained by regressing the self-report scores for a given trait on the peer-report scores 
across all participants, with the standardized residuals saved as a new variable and used 
for later analysis. This procedure removes the variance in self-reports that is shared with 
peer-reported trait levels, leaving in the residual any tendency to represent trait levels as 
higher or lower than what would be predicted based on partners’ ratings. Thus, an 
individual with a large, positive WT-SCR for Extraversion overclaimed that trait to a 
greater extent than did most other participants. 
The second SCR assessed the extent to which a given participant over- or under-
claimed one trait relative to other traits. We label this SCR a “within-participant self-
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criterion residual” (WP-SCR). These SCRs are necessary for analyzing trends within an 
individual, such as the extent to which his or her misrepresentations of trait levels are 
predicted by personal views of trait desirability. WP-SCRs were obtained by regressing 
self-report scores for all traits on peer-report scores for all traits in a regression run across 
all traits within a single participant. Standardized residuals were saved as a new variable 
and used for later analysis. As with WT-SCRs, this procedure removes the variance in 
self-report of a trait that is shared with peer-reported trait levels, leaving in the residual 
any tendency of the individual to represent the level of a given trait differently than 
would be predicted by the partner’s ratings of that trait. WT-SCRs and WP-SCRs differ 
in that the former uses variance in self-reported levels of a given trait by the entire 
sample, while the latter uses variance in self-reported levels of all traits within a given 
individual. The WP-SCRs can thus be described as an index of the extent to which an 
individual overclaims each trait relative to the other traits, whereas the WT-SCRs can be 
described as an index of the extent to which an individual overclaims each trait relative to 
other individuals.  
Though our sample size provides a good deal of power for analyzing across-
participant comparisons for each trait (WT-SCRs), the power for within-subject 
comparisons (WP-SCRs) is determined by the number of traits being analyzed. The 
number of traits assessed is much smaller than the number of participants, and thus it is 
more difficult to achieve adequate power in analysis of WP-SCRs. Therefore, although 
WT-SCRs were computed using aggregated Big Five traits, WP-SCRs were computed 
using each of the 40 items assessed in the short-form BFAS. Thus, a participant with a 
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large, positive WP-SCR for “Have a lot of fun” overclaimed that item more than he or 
she overclaimed other items.  
Finally, although our construct of interest concerns the tendency to exaggerate 
traits because of their idiographic desirability, differences in the way people use Likert 
scales may also influence the associations of trait desirability with self-reports and thus 
with SCRs. For example, individual differences in tendencies such as extreme responding 
(in which individuals predominantly use the ends of the Likert scale) will produce an 
increase in associations between all self-report measures. This would exaggerate the role 
of idiographic desirability in inducing overclaiming, and a more conservative test of IDR 
requires eliminating effects due to extreme responding. To remove any such effects from 
desirability ratings we created residuals for each of the Big Five, predicting each trait in 
turn with the remaining four. These residualized desirability ratings thus contained the 
desirability a given individual assigned to that Big Five trait after removing any variance 
shared with the desirability ratings of other Big Five traits, including any variance due to 
extreme responding. It was these residualized desirability ratings that were then used in 
the analyses below; supplementary analyses using nonresidualized desirability ratings 
provided substantively the same pattern of associations that is reported below, though 
with slightly larger values. 
 
II.4 Results 
Desirability ratings for each trait were strongly correlated with self-report ratings 
for the same trait. As shown in Table 1, desirability ratings were highly correlated with 
their corresponding self-rating across the Big Five (e.g., the association of 
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Openness/Intellect desirability ratings and Openness/Intellect self-ratings was .64), with a 
mean association of .60. Further, these associations were highly specific: the absolute 
value of every cross-trait correlation (e.g. between Openness/Intellect desirability and 
Emotional Stability self-ratings, r = -.06) was below .20, and the mean of the absolute 
values of all cross-trait correlations was .07.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The association of desirability ratings with self-ratings of trait levels may indicate 
the presence of a true association in which individuals value the traits they actually 
possess, but it is also consistent with an idiographic response tendency in which people 
over-report the presence of traits they value. A third option is that both accuracy and bias 
in self-reported personality are indicated by these associations. To address the question of 
accuracy, we explored the association between the target’s ratings of trait desirability and 
peer ratings of the target’s personality. As with self-reported personality, Table 1 shows 
that highly significant associations were generally found between desirability levels and 
peer-reported trait levels, with a mean association across the Big Five of .31. These 
associations were also highly specific, with no cross-trait association above .20 in 
absolute value and a mean absolute cross-trait association of .04.  
There are thus clear indications that trait desirability ratings are associated with 
actual personality levels. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the associations with peer-
reported personality were considerably smaller (mean of .31) than they had been with 
self-reported personality (mean of .60). It is thus worth exploring possible associations 
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with bias – that is, whether those rating a trait as particularly desirable tend to 
systematically over-report their levels of the trait in question. The associations between 
trait desirability and WT-SCRs shown in Table 1 indicate that an effect of this nature is 
present, with strong associations for all traits and a mean association of .52. These effects 
are also highly specific, with only one cross-trait correlation above .20 in absolute value 
and a mean absolute cross-trait association of .07. 
The substantial associations between trait desirability and WT-SCRs indicate that 
someone who viewed a given trait as highly desirable was more likely to overclaim that 
trait than was someone who viewed the trait as less desirable.  (For negatively valenced 
traits, the converse holds: someone who viewed a trait as particularly undesirable was 
more likely to under-claim that trait than was someone who viewed the trait as less 
undesirable.)  
To explore whether participants differed in the degree to which their views of trait 
desirability influenced their tendency to over- or under-claim a particular trait requires 
analyzing the associations between desirability and SCRs computed within each 
participant (WP-SCRs). The mean and median correlations between desirability ratings 
and WP-SCRs were .46 and .49, indicating that the average participant’s tendency to 
overclaim traits was strongly predicted by his or her perception of the desirability of 
those traits. The tendency to over- or under-claim traits based on desirability appears to 
be reliably assessed (the Spearman-Brown adjusted split-half reliability of odd- and even-
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numbered items was .77) and to vary considerably between individuals (range: -.40 to 
.88, SD = .24).2
II.5 Discussion 
  
 The correlations between people’s self-reported ideal characteristics and the 
ratings provided by their partners of their actual characteristics indicate that, to a 
significant extent, people truly possessed the characteristics that they viewed as valuable. 
At the same time, the associations between self-reported ideal characteristics and self-
rated actual personality were considerably stronger, indicating that although people may 
tend to have the characteristics they value, this association may be stronger in their own 
perceptions than in reality. WT-SCRs index the remaining variance in a self-report after 
the variance shared with the criterion measure is removed, and would thus capture any 
bias that was present in self-report but absent from the criterion. The strong correlation 
between self-rated ideal personality and these residuals indicated that bias of this nature 
was present. We believe this pattern is most consistent with a tendency to value the traits 
one has (shown by the association between peer-ratings and self-rated ideals) as well as a 
tendency to imagine oneself as having slightly more desirable traits than one truly does. 
Using WP-SCRs, we further demonstrated that while the typical participant tended to 
overclaim traits as a function of how desirable he perceived that trait to be, considerable 
variance existed between individuals in this tendency. 
 One limitation of Sample 1 is that only the partner’s report of the target’s 
personality was available as an indicator of true trait levels. Previous work has indicated 
                                                          
2 The gaps between self- and peer-reports can also be obtained using difference scores, and a highly 
comparable pattern of results was obtained when these were used in place of both WT-SCRs and WP-
SCRs. 
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that partners share similar values and may be prone to see each other in an overly positive 
light (Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002). To the extent that this is 
the case, self-reported values of traits would show inflated associations with partner-
reported trait levels and suppressed associations with self-criterion residuals obtained 
using partner report as the criterion. The use of an objective criterion measure is 
important for confirming the reality of the connection between trait valuation and true 
trait levels. 
II.6 Sample 2 
 In Sample 2 we looked to replicate and extend the results found with Sample 1. 
Whereas the latter had only one peer rater of trait levels, each trait in Sample 2 was 
assessed with multiple raters, providing a more accurate picture of trait levels (Connelly 
& Ones, 2010). For a particularly rigorous test of IDR’s ability to identify bias in self-
report we used an additional measure for one trait, assessing intelligence not only by peer 
report but also with an objective test. We also tested whether IDR’s effects can be seen 
for traits outside of the mental domain by looking at physical attractiveness. 
To establish the relative importance of bias due to IDR, its ability to predict 
overclaiming was compared against an established SDR measure. Finally, we explored 
the nature of individual differences in the tendency to engage in IDR. First we 
hypothesized a connection between IDR and SDR, which would indicate the existence of 
a general willingness to claim desirable traits. Second, we hypothesized that those with a 
positive view of themselves would be more likely to believe they had the traits they 
viewed as most desirable, even to the point of overclaiming those traits. 
II.7 Method 
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II.7.1 Participants  
Participants in this study were members of the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample 
(ESCS), a group that was recruited by mail from lists of homeowners in the Eugene-
Springfield area. ESCS participants agreed to complete questionnaires delivered by mail 
over a period of 10 years beginning in 1994 in exchange for cash. In line with the 
community from which the sample was drawn, most participants identified as White 
(97%), with 1% or less identified as Hispanic, Asian American, Native American, or 
declining to report their ethnicity. The sample is primarily middle aged (Mean age = 51 
years, SD = 12.36, range = 18-80), and reported a range of educational attainment, with a 
median of two years of post-secondary education completed. The measures used in the 
present study were assessed over a period of several years, reducing the total N available 
for analysis. We used all participants for whom data was available for self-report on 
personality, trait desirability, and two or more peer-reports of personality. After 
excluding two participants whose responses indicated obvious inattention (all 97 trait 
desirability ratings were marked as “neither desirable nor undesirable), our sample for the 
primary analyses below was 541 (58% female), though a somewhat smaller portion of 
this pool had completed the additional measures of intelligence, SDR, and self-esteem 
described below. The 1,520 individuals providing peer-report data were 61% male, 
ranging in age from 6 to 94 (Mean age = 48 years, sd = 17.81). Previous work on 
informant reports in this sample (DeYoung, 2006) showed no effect from removing 
younger raters from the sample, so the present analyses were conducted using all 
available peer reports.  
II.7.2 Measures 
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II.7.2.1 Big Five  
Big Five personality traits were assessed with a mailing of the 44-item Big Five 
Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) and Saucier’s (1994a) 40-item Mini-Markers 
(SMM), with two items added to each instrument assessing physical attractiveness. These 
measures were also completed independently by two or three peers who knew the 
participants well and were asked to rate them. Both instruments were completed in Fall of 
1998 using a Likert-type scale with answers ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Scores for Big Five personality and physical attractiveness for both self- 
and peer-report were obtained by taking the mean of all items for each trait from both the 
BFI and SMM, yielding alphas between .84 and .94. As significant correlations are often 
found between IQ and Openness/Intellect (DeYoung, 2011), it is no surprise that many of 
the Openness/Intellect items have high face validity for assessing intelligence (e.g. 
“unintelligent,” “perceptive”). A subset of Openness/Intellect items judged by the authors 
to be most directly relevant to intelligence were selected, including Complex, Deep, 
Intellectual, Philosophical, Unintelligent, “Is ingenious, a deep thinker,” and “Likes to 
reflect, play with ideas.” Post-hoc analyses confirmed that mean peer-report for each item 
correlated at .25 or above with objective intelligence, and the resulting seven-item scale 
had alphas for self- and peer-report of .84 and .87, respectively. 
II.7.2.2 Desirability  
To assess individual differences in beliefs about the value of certain traits, participants 
were asked to rate “how desirable or undesirable you feel it is for others to be or act this 
way” for a list of 97 characteristics constituted primarily by personality traits. Responses 
were provided in a mailing in summer of 2001, with participants rating each 
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characteristic on a 9-point Likert-type scale anchored by “very undesirable” and “very 
desirable.” Twenty-five of these adjectives are included in Saucier’s Mini-Markers, but 
an additional 54 were shown to be associated with a Big Five trait in Saucier and 
Goldberg’s (1996) analysis of the factor structure of personality adjectives. Scores for the 
desirability of Big Five traits were obtained by taking the mean of the adjectives 
associated in those reports with a given trait, yielding scales with the following 
properties: Openness/Intellect (11 items, alpha = .78), Conscientiousness (19 items, alpha 
= .85), Extraversion (17 items, alpha = .68), Agreeableness (21 items, alpha = .87), and 
Emotional Stability (11 items, alpha = .61). The desirability of physical attractiveness is 
indicated by a composite of the desirability of “attractive” and “sexy,” which correlate 
.46. Finally, several of the items have high face validity for assessing intelligence: the 
authors identified Complex, Insightful, Perceptive, Philosophical, and Unintelligent, with 
the resulting scale yielding an alpha of .66. Each of these came from the 
Openness/Intellect scale. Sixteen remaining adjectives that were assessed in this sample 
did not have loadings above .30 on any Big Five trait in Saucier and Goldberg’s (1996) 
analysis, and were thus not incorporated in the present study. 
II.7.2.3 Intelligence  
Participants in the ESCS completed Cattell’s 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF; 
Conn & Rieke, 1994) in 1996. Factor B of this instrument is a 15-item performance test 
of intelligence consisting of knowledge and reasoning problems with multiple choice 
answers. Previous work has found the scale to correlate .57 with Full Scale IQ from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (Wechsler, 1981), supporting its use as an 
intelligence assessment (Abel & Brown, 1998). 
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II.7.2.4 Socially desirable responding  
Tendencies towards socially desirable responding (SDR) were assessed in the ESCS in 
1998 with the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus 1991). In 
this edition of the BIDR, two different dimensions of SDR are assessed: Impression 
Management (IM) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE). IM captures moralistic 
denial of socially-deviant behaviors, while SDE measures egoistic overconfidence and 
claims to superiority. The alphas for these scales (IM = .82; SDE = .68) were comparable 
to that found in previous work (Li & Bagger, 2007). 
II.7.2.5 Self-Esteem  
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) measures global feelings of self-
worth, and was administered in 1998 to ESCS participants with a 5-point Likert-type 
scale. The alpha reliability for this measure was .84 in the present sample. 
II.7.3 Analysis 
Based on the rationale and methods described for Sample 1, we obtained both WT-SCRs 
and WP-SCRs using peer report data for Big Five and attractiveness. For intelligence, we 
used objective performance as assessed by Cattell’s Factor B in addition to peer report, as 
described further below. As noted above, WT-SCRs assess individual differences in the 
tendency to self-report trait levels differently than would be indicated by the criterion.  In 
contrast, WP-SCRs identify differences within a person in the traits they most over- or 
under-claim.   
The desirability ratings used in this study were also adjusted in the same fashion 
as with Sample 1 in order to reduce the role of response biases such as extreme-
responding (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). We predicted the desirability for each trait from 
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the desirability of the others in a regression and saved the residual, which thus represents 
the desirability of a given trait after removing the variance shared with the desirability 
ratings of other traits. (Because our assessment of intelligence’s desirability derives 
entirely from Openness/Intellect items it was not entered into the regression for other 
traits; its residual was thus obtained using all traits but Openness/Intellect as predictors.) 
It was these residualized desirability ratings that were then used in the analyses below.  
II.8 Results 
II.8.1 Trait desirability’s association with single-criterion constructs 
Replicating the results found with Sample 1, desirability ratings for the Big Five 
and attractiveness were correlated with self-report ratings for the same. As shown in 
Table 2, the associations between desirability ratings and their corresponding self-ratings 
were all highly significant, with a mean across the Big Five of .35. That is, the more an 
individual believed a given trait was desirable, the more of that trait he or she claimed to 
have. As with Sample 1, these associations were highly specific, with a mean absolute 
value of Big Five cross-trait correlations of .05. Two such associations were significant at 
p<.05 (uncorrected for multiple testing) in both samples: those who viewed 
Openness/Intellect as desirable tended to report lower levels of Conscientiousness, while 
those who viewed Conscientiousness as desirable tended to report lower levels of 
Openness/Intellect. Outside the Big Five, beliefs about the desirability of attractiveness 
were modestly correlated with self-reported levels. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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The association between self-ratings of desirability and peer-ratings of the target’s 
personality are shown in Table 2 and were also highly significant, with a mean 
association across the Big Five of .24. The relatively low association found for Emotional 
Stability is consistent with previous work showing relatively low peer accuracy for this 
trait (Vazire, 2010), as any true variance in personality associated with desirability ratings 
for Emotional Stability may be harder to detect because peer-reports are a less effective 
criterion for this trait than they are for others. It may also be influenced by the relatively 
low alpha (.61) noted above for our scale assessing the desirability of Emotional 
Stability. The mean absolute value of all Big Five cross-trait associations was .05, 
indicating these associations were highly specific. Outside of the Big Five, peer reports of 
the target’s attractiveness were uncorrelated with the target’s perception of the 
desirability of attractiveness (.06, p > .1), though targets who assigned high desirability to 
Agreeableness were viewed as slightly more attractive (r = .18, p < .001). Interpretation 
of these results is difficult because of the low reliability of the two-item scale used to 
indicate the desirability of this trait.  
As with Sample 1, trait desirability ratings did not simply indicate true trait levels 
(indexed by the various criteria), but were also associated with systematic overclaiming 
of the trait levels involved. Table 2 shows the associations between trait desirability and 
WT-SCRs, with significant associations for all traits and a mean across the Big Five of 
.26. These associations were highly specific, with a mean absolute value of the cross-trait 
correlations of .03. One such association was significant at p < .05 (uncorrected for 
multiple testing) in both samples, with those viewing Emotional Stability as desirable 
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tending to understate their level of Agreeableness. Outside of the Big Five, those who 
viewed physical attractiveness as desirable were more likely to overclaim the trait.  
This sample was more heterogeneous than Sample 1, but controlling for 
participants’ age, sex, and education produced no substantive changes to the pattern of 
results presented in Table 2. 
II.8.2 Desirability and multiple-criteria constructs 
As discussed above, SCRs represent any variance in self-reported personality not 
shared with the criterion, and as such have been proposed as an indicator of the extent to 
which an individual over- or under-claims a trait (Paulhus & John, 1998). Nevertheless, 
as self-reports have been consistently shown to incrementally improve the predictive 
validity of peer report (Connelly & Ones, 2010), some of the variance in self report that 
accurately reflects trait levels may not be shared with peer reports. To the extent that this 
is the case, some of the variance in SCRs represents true variance in trait levels. This 
represents a potential challenge to the interpretation of the association between 
desirability and SCRs as a demonstration for IDR. One way to surmount this challenge is 
to compare peer-reports to a more objective criterion, which we did in the present context 
using the trait of intelligence, for which we have a performance based measure as well as 
peer-report levels.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
As shown in Table 3, intelligence behaved similarly to the traits discussed above: 
perceptions of the desirability of intelligence were associated with self-reported levels, 
30 
 
 
 
true trait levels, and SCRs. Consistent with expectations, peer-reports did not remove all 
true trait variance from self-reports: a WT-SCR created using peer-report was modestly 
but significantly associated with performance on our intelligence measure (r = .16, p < 
.001). At the same time, trait desirability is significantly associated with a dual-criterion 
WT-SCR (which has had variance self-report shares with peer-report and with objective 
intelligence); in fact, this correlation is not smaller (p > .1) than was the correlation 
between desirability and the peer-report WT-SCR. Thus, the effects of IDR were not only 
present even when using multiple indicators of trait levels, but the addition of an 
objective measure of trait levels did not provide a significant reduction in the ability of 
trait desirability to predict overclaiming. The heavy reliance on peer-reported trait levels 
as criteria in studies of overclaiming (Paulhus et al., 2003; Pauls & Crost, 2003) thus 
appears to be well-justified, particularly given the difficulty of performance-based 
measurement of Big Five trait levels (Furr & Funder, 2007). 
II.8.3 Socially Desirable Responding 
 The results reported above indicate that individual differences in perceptions of 
trait desirability were associated both with true differences in personality and with a 
tendency to overclaim traits viewed as desirable. Consistent with previous studies (Pauls 
& Stemmler, 2003) we found that two existing scales measuring socially desirable 
responding (Impression Management and Self-Deceptive Enhancement; Paulhus, 1991) 
were associated with bias in personality self-report. As shown in Table 4, Impression 
Management was associated with a tendency to overclaim these same characteristics as 
measured by WT-SCRs. Self-Deceptive Enhancement predicted a tendency to overclaim 
these traits as well as both Openness/Intellect and Intelligence. (We used the intelligence 
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residual which removed the variance from both peer-report and objective intelligence for 
the analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5.) 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 Results from multiple regressions in which overclaiming of a given trait was 
predicted simultaneously by the desirability of that trait as well as IM and SDE are 
presented in Table 5.  Desirability ratings remained significant predictors for their 
respective traits, and were superior to IM and SDE in predicting overclaiming for 
Openness/Intellect, Extraversion, Agreeableness and intelligence. To confirm the 
independence of IDR from SDR, we ran two stepwise multiple regressions for each trait. 
The first of these entered the BIDR measures first and then tested for improvements in R2 
after entering trait desirability ratings. The second entered desirability ratings first and 
then tested for improvements in R2 after entering BIDR scores. In both of these analyses, 
all associations identified as significant in Table 5 produced significant improvements in 
R2, confirming the independence of SDR and IDR.  
II.8.4 Individual differences in IDR  
Participants in Sample 1 varied in the extent to which desirability influenced a 
given participant’s level of over- or under-claiming trait levels. To replicate this result we 
analyzed the associations between WP-SCRs with trait desirability levels within 
participants in Sample 2. Within-subjects comparisons would not be adequately powered 
at the level of the Big Five, but as noted above, 25 of the 44 adjectives assessed in 
Saucier’s Mini-Markers were also included in the desirability assessment, with nearly 
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equal representation across the Big Five (O:5, C:4, E:5, A:6, ES:5). We obtained 
correlation coefficients for each participant that indicated the association between WP-
SCRs and trait desirability levels for these traits. The mean and median correlations for 
the sample were both .26, with a considerable range around this value (range: -.41 to .87, 
sd: .21), replicating our findings in Sample 1 of variation in the tendency to over- or 
under-claim traits based on desirability. Estimates of this value appear to be reliable, as 
indicated by a Spearman-Brown adjusted split-half reliability (based on odd- and even-
numbered items) of  .60; this is lower than was found in Sample 1, as might be expected 
based on the smaller number of traits available for analysis than in this sample.  
Finally, this index of IDR-based bias was associated with existing constructs. 
High scorers also tended to be high in Self-Esteem (r = .17, p < .001) and to score highly 
on SDR (SDE r = .21, p <.001; IM r = .10, p < .05). 
II.9 Discussion 
II.9.1 Desirable Responding: Two Approaches 
While a vast literature demonstrates the practical utility of personality as 
measured by self-report inventories, concerns over the accuracy of such reports are 
almost as old as the inventories themselves (Edwards, 1957). The range of measures 
developed to identify the tendency to misrepresent one’s personality in such assessments 
are often discussed as tracking two distinct patterns of such misrepresentation, with some 
measures (e.g. Impression Management: Paulhus, 1984; Wiggins’ Sd scale: Wiggins, 
1959) primarily assessing a tendency to deny socially deviant impulses, while others 
(Self-Deceptive Enhancement: Paulhus, 1984; Edwards’ SD scale: Edwards & Walker, 
1961) identify those more prone to represent themselves as exceptionally talented and 
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socially prominent. These patterns of moralistic and egoistic bias are thought to have 
different motivations (Paulhus & John, 1998) and different eliciting contexts (Paulhus & 
Trapnell, 2008), showing that causes and patterns of bias in self-report personality are too 
diverse to be captured by a single construct.  
An additional body of intriguing recent work has looked to identify differences in 
SDR by measuring the extent to which an individual’s self-report of personality traits 
matches the desirability ratings for those traits as provided by a group of raters 
(Asendorpf & Ostendorf, 1998; Konstabel, Aavik, & Allik, 2006; Saucier, 1994b) rather 
than relying on purpose-built SDR scales. But whereas these lines of research have 
identified individual differences in the extent to which people tend to bias self-reports 
according to universally-applicable patterns of values, a few studies have pursued an 
alternative path, looking at individual differences in which traits are desired. Sinha and 
Krueger (1998) showed that differences in perceived trait desirability predicted 
differences in the self-reported trait levels, though, because their study lacked a 
comparison to a criterion, it remained unclear whether this finding indicated 
misrepresentation. More recently, Borkenau et al. (2009) reported that individual 
differences in the perceived optimal trait level (POTL) were associated with self-reported 
trait levels. Using peer-reported personality as a criterion measure, this association was 
shown to partially reflect reality: POTL was significantly associated with the peer-
reported level of that trait. At the same time, POTL ratings were more closely matched to 
self-reported personality than to peer-report. Borkenau et al. (2009) interpreted the latter 
association as an indication that POTL acts as a source of bias in personality self-report. 
However, having established POTL as an indicator of true trait variance, it is also 
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possible that some or even all of the variance found in self- but not peer-report that is 
shared with POTL was in fact true trait variance. The use of additional indicators of trait 
levels is needed to clarify the extent to which this relationship between POTL and self-
report reflects true variance or bias. 
In the present study we expanded on these previous findings. Rather than 
assessing the effect of perceptions of what trait level was optimal, we looked at the effect 
of perceptions of how desirable the trait was. This is similar to the procedure used in the 
development of SDR measures (e.g. Jackson & Messick, 1961), and allowed the use of 
multiple regression to demonstrate the independence and relative importance of IDR and 
SDR. As expected, ratings of trait desirability were associated not only with actual trait 
levels but also with the tendency to misrepresent oneself in self-report of trait levels. Per 
recommended practice (cf. Paulhus & John, 1998), bias was measured with Self-Criterion 
Residuals (SCRs). Our observation of an association between SCRs and independent 
measures of trait levels is consistent with the ability of both self- and peer-report trait 
levels to incrementally improve each others’ validity (Connelly & Ones, 2010). Despite 
these associations, however, SCRs remained an effective index of bias, particularly with 
peer-report trait levels as a criterion: a dual-criterion SCR for intelligence was not 
significantly less associated with trait desirability than was one created using only peer-
report. This finding indicates the robustness of IDR. Further, IDR’s capacity to predict 
bias was independent of bias predicted by SDR measures, and for most traits IDR was as 
an equal or even superior predictor. 
Bias in self-reports based on perceived trait desirability was shown to exist as 
both a mean-level phenomenon (with most participants tending to overclaim traits to the 
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extent that they view those traits as desirable) as well as an individual difference 
characteristic, with some participants more prone to this tendency than others. These 
differences in level of IDR have modest but significant associations with social 
desirability measures, indicating the potential presence of a common tendency behind the 
bias of self-reported personality in both a socially and idiographically desirable manner. 
IDR was also more pronounced in those with more positive global self-evaluations, as 
indicated by the associations with Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). As 
previous work has indicated that high-scorers on measures of self-worth may be more 
prone to SDR (e.g. Paulhus & Reid, 1991), our finding that those with high self-worth 
also overclaim the traits they personally view as desirable is expected.  
II.9.2 Comparisons between the two studies 
Our results suggest that the effect of individual differences in perceived trait 
desirability is robust to different methods of assessment. In the first sample participants 
rated their ideal selves, while participants in Sample 2 were asked to evaluate the 
desirability of a given trait in other people. To the extent that an individual holds different 
views of the desirability of a trait based on the individual possessing the trait (themselves 
versus others), these different assessment methods may partially account for the fact that 
stronger associations were observed between desirability and personality in Sample 1 
than in Sample 2 (although because the samples were demographically quite different as 
well, the source of this difference remains speculative). Also important for this question 
are the differences between Sample 1 and 2 in timing of the assessments: the assessments 
for Sample 1 were contemporaneous, whereas Sample 2 had a two-year gap in between 
the assessment of personality and trait desirability. Though personality is highly stable 
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over time (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008), an interval of this length is likely sufficient to 
produce some meaningful changes in rank-order personality (Ludtke, Roberts, Trautwein, 
& Nagy, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011). Any such change would likely 
attenuate the relationship between desirability and personality, consistent with the smaller 
associations observed in Sample 2.  
Trait desirability ratings thus showed substantially higher associations with both 
self- and peer personality ratings in Sample 1 than in Sample 2, though with the present 
data it is not possible to determine whether this derives from the different methods of 
assessing desirability or instead results from demographic differences between samples or 
the time gap between assessments in Sample 2. These factors may also have affected the 
associations between desirability and SCRs. Should individuals differ in the extent to 
which they believe a trait is desirable in themselves rather than in others, it may be the 
former that better predicts overclaiming. Similarly, time-discrepancy in the assessment of 
desirability and of personality would attenuate the connections between the two. Finally, 
the SCRs in Sample 1 likely contained more true trait variance than did those of Sample 
2, as the former sample had only a single peer-report available to identify and remove 
true trait variance from the SCR. Each of these is consistent with the observation of 
stronger correlations between desirability and SCRs in Sample 1 than Sample 2. At the 
same time, it is possible that the SCRs from both studies had lost some variance in self-
reports which reflected overclaiming, as those who provided peer-ratings of trait levels 
tended to be relationship partners, family members, and friends. To the extent that those 
in such relationships have similar views of which traits are desirable and tend to provide 
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an overly positive report on their peer, the effects of IDR will be underestimated in 
studies relying on such reporters. 
Another important comparison between the results obtained in our two studies 
concerns the cross-trait associations. As no such associations were hypothesized and very 
few of those observed in one sample were replicated in the other we are doubly reluctant 
to offer substantive interpretation of them. Nevertheless, the reciprocal negative 
association between the desirability and self-ratings of Openness/Intellect and 
Conscientiousness (found in both studies) is intriguing: these two traits have opposing 
associations with political orientation, with liberals characterized by high 
Openness/Intellect and low Conscientiousness (Hirsh et al., 2010). The observed 
association is also consistent with Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham’s (2004) 
compensatory theory, in which those in a competitive work force who are low in 
cognitive ability may compensate by becoming more Conscientious. As expected, 
supplementary analyses indicated that those who rank Conscientiousness as highly 
desirable tended to be lower in cognitive ability, as assessed by our performance measure 
(r = -.20, p < .001). 
II.9.3 Considerations for future work 
One area for future work concerns clarifying the relations between individual 
differences in overclaiming based on IDR and scores on measures of SDR and self-
esteem. The associations found in Sample 2 are likely an underestimate of both of these 
associations, due to ceiling effects produced by the limited range of response options 
available in the personality assessments. Consider the effects of a 5-point Likert-type 
format in the case of an individual’s rating a given trait as extremely desirable or 
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undesirable. The positive correlation of desirability ratings with self- and peer-reported 
personality reported above indicate that such individuals will likely be rated extremely on 
this trait by both themselves and their peers. Such an event was not infrequent: even in 
Sample 2, which relied on multiple peer raters, roughly 20 percent of our sample had 
mean-peer ratings of 1 or 5 for any given individual adjective, though aggregated trait 
ratings such as for a Big Five trait were much less affected by this. At a conceptual level, 
this can be seen to impair our ability to rate individual differences in the tendency to 
over- or under-claim trait levels based on desirability, as the traits which individuals were 
most likely to overclaim were also those that they were not able to, given that their peers 
assigned them the most extreme score available for that trait.  
At an empirical level, the consequences of this limit appear to have had an effect: 
supplementary analyses on sample 2 treated all traits for which a given participant was 
given a 1 or 5 mean peer score as missing for that subject when computing WP-SCRs and 
correlating them with desirability ratings. Although the reduced number of variables 
available for assessing each subject’s tendency to rely on IDR would ordinarily reduce 
the accuracy of the resulting value for each participant’s IDR, in this analysis the 
resulting index of individual differences in IDR showed slightly stronger associations 
with the various criterion variables (SDE, IM, and Self-Esteem). Future work on the topic 
should allow for a wider array of response options, ideally allowing extreme designations 
such as “top 1%” to allow subjects to identify truly extreme scorers more clearly. This 
work will make it easier to identify individual differences in IDR, a necessary step 
towards clarifying the extent of overlap between differences in IDR level and existing 
constructs. In particular, a more precise estimate of differences in IDR level than was 
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possible in the present study may allow researchers to differentiate between the 
motivations and outcomes for different patterns of self-enhancement. For example, 
individuals who tend to overclaim a trait in proportion to their own views of its 
desirability might be expected to be high in self-esteem, whereas those who are more 
prone to overclaim a trait in proportion to consensual views of its desirability might be 
expected to score high in Impression Management.  
 Future research may also look to explore the development of the association 
between perceived desirability and actual trait levels. Supplementary analyses from 
Sample 2 suggest that some of the typically observed mean-level changes in personality 
(increases in A, C and ES in adulthood, with decreases in E and O; Roberts et al., 2006) 
may be matched by changes in the desirability of these traits over time: older participants 
viewed Extraversion as less desirable (r with age of respondent: -.14, p < .001) and 
Conscientiousness as more desirable (r = .21, p < .001), while Agreeableness and 
Openness/Intellect had insignificant associations in the expected direction (r = .03, p > .2; 
r = -.02, p > .3). Contrary to expectations, Emotional Stability was viewed as less 
desirable by older participants (r = -.14, p < .001). Longitudinal data is required 
determine whether any associations of this nature might indicate that changes in 
personality over time are preceded by changes in the perception of the desirability of 
traits.  
 Finally, as with any demonstration of the flaws inherent to self-report measures, 
our study highlights the usefulness of alternate sources of information on trait levels such 
as peer-report. One unique contribution provided by the present work concerns how 
certain research questions in personality may derive particular benefit from the use of 
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non-self-report data to indicate trait levels. Specifically, any studies whose outcomes of 
interest might reflect value differences between individuals is likely to report 
systematically exaggerated trait-outcome associations, as those value differences will 
affect not only the outcome measure but also the self-report of the supposed predictor. 
For example, a considerable body of literature has developed to characterize the self-
reported personality differences of those with different orientations on social and political 
matters (reviewed in Jost et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). However, as these 
domains are intricately connected with values, we should expect that their relationships 
with personality traits have been systematically distorted due to the effects of IDR, with 
those at different ends of the spectrum on sociopolitical issues misrepresenting their 
personality in a fashion consistent with the values reflected in their sociopolitical 
orientation. Research in this area and others which explore value-related outcomes would 
thus particularly benefit from the use of non-self-report measures of personality. 
II.10 Conclusion 
The present study highlights the importance of individual differences in producing biased 
self-reports. Existing measures effectively capture such differences in the extent of biased 
responding within certain common patterns (described as egoistic and moralistic bias), 
but are limited in their ability to assess differences in which traits a given individual is 
more or less prone to misrepresent. Individual differences in perceived trait desirability 
successfully predicted the traits for which a given individual’s self-report would show 
more or less bias. This process may be more pronounced both among those with high 
self-esteem as well as those who score high on conventional bias measures. Future work 
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may look to the role of differences in perceived trait desirability in areas such as 
personality development and sociopolitically-based personality differences. 
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Chapter III: Not as different as we want to be: 
Attitudinally-consistent trait desirability leads to exaggerated associations between 
personality and sociopolitical attitudes (Study 2) 
  
Researchers seeking to understand differences in sociopolitical attitudes in terms of 
associated personality traits have typically relied exclusively on self-report measures of 
personality. A recently-discovered mechanism of bias in self-reports highlights a 
particular challenge for this approach. Specifically, there is evidence that individuals tend 
to report exaggerated levels of a trait to the extent that they view that trait as desirable. In 
a community sample of 443 participants whose personality was also rated by three peers, 
differences in sociopolitical attitudes were associated with differences in the extent to 
which an individual would overclaim a given trait as well as differences in views of the 
desirability that trait. Further, the tendency to overclaim traits in a manner consistent with 
one’s sociopolitical attitudes was mediated by differences in views of trait desirability. 
Thus, although meaningful personality differences do exist among those with differing 
sociopolitical attitudes, those differences may not be as large as people with opposing 
sociopolitical attitudes might like them to be. 
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III.1 Introduction 
A considerable body of work has stressed the importance of personality in the 
development of sociopolitical attitudes. Two distinct sociopolitical attitude dimensions 
have been identified as forming the basis of typical differences between the left and right 
of the political spectrum (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). The first dimension concerns 
attitudes towards change, contrasting approval of change with a preference for 
traditionalism and order. This dimension is commonly assessed using Altemeyer’s (1988) 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale. The second dimension concerns attitudes 
towards inequality, contrasting egalitarianism with anti-egalitarianism, and is commonly 
assessed using the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Conservatives tend to score higher than liberals in both RWA 
and SDO, indicating that they are more authoritarian and anti-egalitarian. As discussed 
further below, recent meta-analyses identify the personality traits Openness to 
Experience, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Intelligence as predictors of RWA 
and/or SDO (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). In the 
present study, however, the associations of personality with sociopolitical attitudes were 
shown to be exaggerated, apparently reflecting a tendency for self-ratings of personality 
to reflect not only who we are but who we want to be. We found support for a model in 
which systematic differences in the traits that are desired by people with different 
sociopolitical attitudes led them to claim to be more different from each other than they 
actually were.  
 This bias is present in the research literature because connections between 
personality traits and attitudes have been established nearly exclusively through the use 
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of self-reports. Although the utility of self-report assessments of personality is well 
established (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg 2007), concerns over the 
vulnerability of these assessments to distortion have been raised for over half a century 
(Edwards, 1957). The research described in Study 1 identified a mechanism of bias in 
self-report that may be of particular concern when identifying the personality bases of 
sociopolitical orientation: Individual differences in the perception of which traits are 
desirable leads to bias in personality assessment because people tend to overclaim traits 
to the extent that they perceive those trait to be desirable. This bias contrasts with 
“socially desirable responding” (SDR; Paulhus, 2002), in which people tend to claim a 
particular set of traits that society (rather than the specific individual) finds desirable, and 
is therefore labeled idiographically desirable responding (IDR). To illustrate IDR by 
example, someone who values Extraversion highly is likely to exaggerate his 
Extraversion in self-report to a greater extent than someone who does not value 
Extraversion. Whereas assessment of SDR merely requires knowing what traits are 
generally desirable, assessment of IDR requires asking each participant about the 
desirability of each trait.  
 IDR is relevant to the association of personality characteristics with sociopolitical 
attitudes because of the well-documented association of sociopolitical attitudes with 
values, many of which pertain to personality-related characteristics such as politeness and 
curiosity (Rohan & Zanna, 1996). Whenever people with differing sociopolitical attitudes 
value such characteristics differently, IDR suggests that they are likely to show differing 
patterns of misrepresentation in self-reports of personality. For example, Self-Direction 
(which concerns Openness-related characteristics such as creativity and curiosity) tends 
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to be valued highly by nonauthoritarians (Rohan & Zanna, 1996), which suggests that 
nonauthoritarians are likely to overclaim Openness. Thus, correlations between 
sociopolitical orientation and personality may be driven not only by real differences in 
personality, but also by the tendency of people with different orientations to exaggerate 
different traits.  
 In the present study, a large community sample of adults was used to test the 
following hypotheses: (1) sociopolitical attitudes are associated with overclaiming in 
personality assessments, (2) when sociopolitical attitudes predict overclaiming for a trait, 
they also predict views of the desirability of that trait, (3) the association of sociopolitical 
attitudes with overclaiming is mediated by self-ratings of trait desirability. We focus on 
traits established by meta-analytic work (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel et al., 2010) 
as relevant to social attitudes: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness, and 
Intelligence.  
III.2 Method 
III.2.1 Participants  
 Participants were members of the Eugene-Springfield Community Sample, a 
predominantly middle-aged group (M = 51 years, SD = 12.36, range = 18–80) drawn 
from lists of local homeowners. Participants were predominantly (97%) Caucasian and 
reported a range of educational attainment, with a median of two years of post-secondary 
education. Surveys were completed by mail over 14 years in exchange for money, 
beginning in 1994. We used all participants for whom data were available for self-
reported personality, trait desirability, and three peer-reports of personality. After 
excluding two participants whose responses indicated obvious inattention (all 97 trait 
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desirability ratings were marked as “neither desirable nor undesirable), 443 participants 
were included. For the analysis of intelligence, 383 participants who completed all 
relevant measures were included.  
III.2.2 Measures 
III.2.2.1 Big Five  
Big Five personality traits were assessed with the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John 
& Srivastava, 1999) and Saucier’s (1994a) 40-item Mini-Markers (MM). These measures 
were also completed independently by three peers who knew the participants well. All 
instruments utilized 5-point Likert scales. Scores for Big Five personality for both self- 
and peer-report were obtained by taking the means of all items for each trait from both 
the BFI and MM, yielding alphas between .84 and .94. As described in Study 1, a subset 
of Openness items related to intelligence (e.g., “insightful,” “unintelligent”) was selected 
to represent self-reported intelligence levels. 
III.2.2.2 Desirability  
Participants were asked to rate “how desirable or undesirable you feel it is for others to be 
or act this way” for a list of 97 characteristics using a 9-point Likert scale, with responses 
translated into trait desirability measures for the Big Five based on Saucier and 
Goldberg’s (1996) analysis of which of these adjectives fell within each Big Five 
construct. To compute the desirability of intelligence, a subset of Openness items was 
selected as described in Study 1. As described in Study 1, scores were adjusted to remove 
the effect of response sets such as extreme responding (in which some people tend to use 
the extreme ends of the scale and others the middle responses), which would artificially 
make some participants appear to value all traits more than other participants. Partialling 
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out the other four Big Five traits from each score ensured that scores reflected the unique 
desirability of each trait for each participant. (Because ratings of intelligence were 
assessed with a subset of Openness items, only the four remaining Big Five traits were 
partialled from intelligence.) Supplementary analyses using raw (unpartialled) 
desirability ratings yielded substantively the same pattern of associations that is reported 
below. 
III.2.2.3 Intelligence 
383 participants completed Cattell’s 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF; Conn & 
Rieke, 1994). Factor B of this instrument is a 15-item intelligence test including 
knowledge and reasoning problems with objectively correct answers in a multiple-choice 
format. Previous research has shown that scores correlate well with Full Scale IQ from 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised, r = .57 (Abel & Brown, 1998). 
III.2.2.4 Social attitudes  
Participants completed a 14-item version of Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA scale and a 10-
item version of Pratto et al.’s (1994) SDO scale. RWA assesses a preference for 
convention, submission to established authorities, and willingness to punish social 
deviants, as exemplified by the item “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of 
our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who 
are ruining everything.” SDO assesses an individual’s willingness to accept group-based 
inequality, and is assessed with items like “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance 
in life than others.” 
III.2.3 Analysis 
48 
 
 
 
 Previous work on identifying social and idiographic influences on overclaiming 
has relied on self-criterion residuals (SCRs) to indicate bias in self-reports (Paulhus & 
John, 1998; Study 1 of this dissertation). SCRs are obtained by predicting self-reported 
trait levels using one or more criteria, with the residual variance not predicted by the 
criteria representing bias. Though most previous work relied exclusively on peer-report 
as a criterion, we used objective performance for the one trait (intelligence) for which 
such data were available.  
 To test our hypothesis that sociopolitical attitudes predict SCRs because 
differences in attitudes are associated with differences in views of the trait desirability, 
we employed structural equation modeling as shown in Figure 1. For Openness, 
Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness, each peer-report served as a criterion. For 
intelligence we created three indicators, each comprising five Factor B items, by 
summing scores for every third item. The three variables on the right of the figure 
constitute a standard mediation analysis, and the inclusion of the latent variable allowed 
us to separate variance due to bias from true trait variance. True trait variance is indicated 
by the agreement among peer and self-ratings and is likely to affect all variables in the 
model, including trait desirability because (as shown in Study 1) people tend to value 
traits that they actually possess. Because most of the variance in self-reports that is due to 
true trait levels (i.e. that is shared with the other indicators of the trait) is accounted for by 
the path from the latent True Trait variable to Self, any other paths leading to Self are 
predicting variance that is roughly equivalent to the SCRs represented in Study 1 and in 
Table 6 of this study. (However, because the model additionally incorporates 
Sociopolitical Attitudes and Trait Desirability as indicators of True Trait Levels, the 
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variance remaining in Self in this model will not be identical to that remaining in the 
SCRs). Because a considerable portion of the reliable variance in self-reports is removed 
from both SCRs and the Self indicator in the model, the proportion of variance remaining 
in each that is due to measurement error will be relatively high, attenuating any potential 
relationships of both SCRs and the Self indicator with other constructs of interest. 
Finally, the number in parentheses is the value for the path from Sociopolitical Attitudes 
to Self when the mediator, Trait Desirability, was not included in the model.  
III.3 Results 
Table 6 shows correlations between the constructs of interest. Matching the 
results of previous meta-analyses, in self-reports authoritarians were high in 
Conscientiousness but low in Openness and intelligence, and anti-egalitarians were low 
in Agreeableness and Openness (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Very 
similar results were observed for peer reports and objective performance, although RWA 
was not significantly correlated with peer-reported Conscientiousness.   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
We observed comparable associations between sociopolitical attitudes and 
personality as indicated by self- and peer-report as well as objective performance, 
indicating some degree of validity for associations between personality and sociopolitical 
attitudes. Nonetheless, we also found evidence supporting our first hypothesis, that these 
associations were overstated in self-reports. Table 6 includes correlations with SCRs 
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indicating that RWA was associated with overclaiming Conscientiousness but 
underclaiming Openness and intelligence. SDO predicted underclaiming Agreeableness.  
Consistent with our second hypothesis, sociopolitical orientation predicted trait 
desirability for those traits where sociopolitical views predicted overclaiming. 
Authoritarians tended to view Conscientiousness as particularly desirable while placing 
little value on Openness and intelligence. Anti-egalitarians tended to place a low value on 
Agreeableness, with more modest associations observed between SDO and views of the 
desirability of Openness, intelligence, and Conscientiousness. 
Our third hypothesis was tested using the mediation model shown in Figure 1. For 
each instance in which a sociopolitical attitude predicted overclaiming of a trait, we 
tested whether the effect was transmitted through differences in perceived trait 
desirability. Table 2 presents standardized path coefficients and fit indices from these 
models. RMSEA and CFI values indicated the model fit well in all cases. Mediation was 
tested using the bootstrap method (Shrout & Bolger, 2002), and Trait Desirability 
mediated the effect of Sociopolitical Attitudes on Self for all cases at p < .05. That is, the 
association between sociopolitical attitudes and misrepresentation on certain traits could 
be explained by their associations with perceptions of the value of those traits. 
Sociopolitical attitudes had no significant direct effect on self-ratings, after accounting 
for their association with desirability, except in the case of RWA and intelligence, for 
which mediation was only partial.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 and Figure 1 about here 
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Finally, in addition to predicting bias, sociopolitical attitudes were also associated 
with true differences in personality, as indicated by significant paths from the latent True 
Trait to Sociopolitical Attitudes in every model except for the one including 
Conscientiousness and RWA. 
III.4 Discussion 
A large and growing research literature highlights the connections between self-
reported personality measures and sociopolitical attitudes, with recent work looking to 
these connections to explain changes in attitudes over time (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010) and 
even exploring common genetic roots between personality and attitudes (Verhulst, 
Hatemi, & Martin, 2010). Our results suggested that the connection between personality 
and sociopolitical attitudes can contain elements of both truth and fiction. Although 
attitudes did show connections to true latent trait levels in a way that closely matched 
results from recent meta-analyses of self-reports, attitudes were also associated with the 
tendency to over- or under-claim many of these traits. Further, sociopolitical attitudes 
were correlated with perceptions of how desirable certain traits were. Finally, mediation 
analysis showed that these associations between sociopolitical attitudes and exaggeration 
of personality traits could be explained by differences in perceptions of trait desirability 
that were associated with sociopolitical attitudes. This suggested that these attitudes led 
to distortions in self-rated personality traits because they were associated with 
perceptions of the desirability of those personality traits. 
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These results suggest that people with differing views on social and political 
issues may not be as different in personality as previously thought – or as different as 
some of those with opposing views might like to believe. For example, the elevated 
Conscientiousness that is taken to characterize authoritarians (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) 
appeared only in self-report in our study, with the high value authoritarians ascribe to 
Conscientiousness apparently inspiring them to overclaim the trait. Similarly, those low 
in SDO (egalitarians) overclaimed their Agreeableness apparently as a result of the high 
value they placed on the trait, and nonauthoritarians did the same for Openness. 
Importantly, this pattern of results was also detected in a trait for which an objective 
assessment was performed, reducing any concern that our results are merely artifacts of 
inaccurate peer-ratings: nonauthoritarians tended to claim higher levels of intelligence 
than were indicated by objective performance, and this effect was mediated by the high 
value that nonauthoritarians placed on intelligence.  
The present results additionally highlight just how far apart those with different 
sociopolitical views are when it comes to the traits they view as desirable. Future work 
may explore the various effects these differences might have on the political process, 
including candidate selection. For example, whereas left- and right-wing voters tend to 
differ modestly in IQ and Openness (Jost et al., 2003), recent Democratic presidents have 
been markedly higher on these traits than recent Republican presidents (Simonton, 2006), 
perhaps reflecting the high value placed on these traits by the left. Similarly, while 
center-right voters in Italy tend to score modestly higher than center-left voters on 
Conscientiousness, this gap appears more pronounced among Italian political leaders 
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(Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, & Zimbardo, 2003; Caprara, Barbaranelli, & 
Zimbardo, 1999).  
More generally, our results provide a concrete demonstration of the need for 
caution in interpreting any reported connections between self-reports of personality and 
variables, like sociopolitical attitudes, that may reflect the values of individuals. 
Differences in the values placed on different traits have the power to bias self-reports of 
personality such that they show an exaggerated association with other value-related 
constructs. Future research looking to connect personality to value-laden constructs 
would benefit from the use of alternative measures of personality such as peer reports 
(Connelly & Ones, 2010) and objective measures like intelligence tests.  
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Chapter IV: Authoritarianism as a Personality Trait: Evidence from a Longitudinal 
Behavior Genetic Study (Study 3) 
  
Authoritarianism has long been conceived of as a highly stable personality trait (Adorno 
et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981), though recent accounts have argued that authoritarianism 
is too malleable to justify this conception. We provided a test of the trait conception of 
authoritarianism by measuring its stability in a community sample of twins over a 15 year 
period, and by identifying the source of any stability with biometric modeling. Our 
results showed that authoritarianism exhibited a high degree of rank-order stability (r = 
.74). Biometric analyses indicated that this stability derived primarily from genetic 
influences, with changes in authoritarianism due to the unique experiences of the 
individual. In both of these respects, our results were highly comparable to those reported 
for other personality traits in previous work, indicating support for the trait conception of 
authoritarianism. Other results of note included a higher degree of stability among the 
more educated portion of the sample, supporting a hypothesis by Krosnick and Alwin 
(1989).  
  
IV.1 Introduction 
Authoritarianism was represented as a highly stable personality trait in both the 
original conception put forward by Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) as well as the widely-used revision of the construct offered 
by Altemeyer (1981; 1988; 1996). Recent approaches have challenged this view, with 
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several authors (e.g. Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 
2004) arguing that authoritarianism is too susceptible to change to be considered a 
personality trait, and is instead better characterized as a characteristic adaptation 
(McAdams & Pals, 2006) or surface trait (Asendorpf & Aken, 2003). A number of 
conceptualizations of personality traits have been offered in recent years, providing some 
guidelines regarding the features that a psychological characteristic should have in order 
to be considered a “trait.” For example, many theorists suggest that traits must exhibit a 
high degree of stability over time (e.g. Asendorpf & Aken, 2003; McAdams & Pals, 
2006; McCrae & Costa, 2008). Most recent challenges to authoritarianism’s status as a 
trait have focused on its supposed instability, though as longitudinal data on the topic has 
been scarce and dominated by student samples there is a clear need for additional data 
from community based samples. In the present study we analyzed data from a 
community-based longitudinal twin study of adults, seeking to ascertain both the stability 
of authoritarianism over a 15 year interval and the extent to which genetic and 
environmental sources contribute to that stability.  
IV.1.1 Previous research on the stability of authoritarianism and other personality traits 
In one study frequently cited among challenges to the trait conception of 
authoritarianism, individuals asked to anticipate their beliefs during an apocalyptic future 
imagined their future selves to be moderately more authoritarian than did those asked to 
anticipate their beliefs in a future with more stable economic and social conditions 
(Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Other studies went beyond the hypothetical, finding that 
modest-to-moderate changes on an abbreviated authoritarianism measure were 
successfully predicted by authoritarianism-related constructs such as Openness to 
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Experience (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010) and perceptions of the world as a dangerous place 
(Sibley et al., 2007). The interpretation of results from these findings has occurred within 
a problematic conception of personality traits, in which traits are suggested to be 
“immutable” (Sibley et al., p. 358) and “invariant across situations” (Sibley et al., p. 367). 
Both of these conditions are more stringent than is required by contemporary theoretical 
accounts of traits cited above, and as discussed below, such conditions would exclude 
from the trait domain not only authoritarianism but also constructs such as extraversion 
and conscientiousness.  
The claims regarding authoritarianism’s purportedly excessive mutability are not 
typically accompanied by an acknowledgment of previous work highlighting the 
construct’s longitudinal stability, or by an effort to place the experimental results on 
authoritarianism within the context of the broader literature on personality stability. 
Previous work on the former topic includes Altemeyer’s (1996) report that a group of 
alumni assessed first as freshman and then again 18 years later maintained an impressive 
degree of rank-order stability over time, with a correlation of .59 between the two 
assessments. Altemeyer (1996) reports scores that have not been standardized, and he 
does not report the variance for each assessment. However, based on the variance 
observed in the same instrument in different samples, mean-level changes appear to have 
been modest, with authoritarianism scores of participants exhibiting an average decline of 
approximately a third of a standard deviation over this period. Altemeyer (1996) also 
reported very similar results on a different sample assessed 12 years after their freshman 
assessment, reporting a test-rest correlation of .62. When put in the context of recent 
meta-analyses regarding the stability of personality, authoritarianism appears to be more 
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stable over time than other personality traits, not less. For example, the correlation 
between trait levels at ages 18 and 22 is only expected to be .54, with even more modest 
correlations expected for longer time intervals (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Similarly, 
Roberts, Walton, & Viechbauer (2006) report that increases of half a standard deviation 
or greater are expected for Openness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Social 
Dominance during the ages in which Altemeyer’s (1996) participants showed a mean 
shift of a third of a standard deviation in authoritarianism. 
Nevertheless, there are important limitations to the generalizability of 
Altemeyer’s (1996) results concerning the stability of authoritarianism over time. His 
studies considered change during only one segment of the life course (early adulthood), 
and relied on exclusively on college-student populations. College-educated individuals 
differ from those without post-secondary degrees in their levels of authoritarianism 
(McCourt et al., 1999), and Krosnick and Alwin (1989) hypothesized that advanced 
education may act to solidify political attitudes, which would lead to elevated levels of 
stability among educated samples. Studies using samples with more diverse educational 
backgrounds are clearly needed. 
Because the rank-order stability for personality traits typically increases with age 
(Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000), a conception of authoritarianism as a personality trait 
leads to the prediction that samples older than that used by Altemeyer should show 
greater levels of stability. This stability may be especially pronounced among more 
educated individuals, as hypothesized by Krosnick and Alwin (1989). In addition, while 
authoritarianism is known to be substantially influenced by genetic factors (McCourt et 
al., 1999), we are aware of no study which has looked at the role of genetic and 
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environmental influences on stability and change in authoritarianism over time. Previous 
work on personality traits (e.g. Johnson, McGue, & Krueger, 2005) has shown that 
genetic factors contribute almost exclusively to rank-order stability in traits over time, 
while nonshared environmental factors account for rank-order change.  
The data used in the present study were collected from a community-based 
sample of twins who were assessed for authoritarianism in middle-age and then again 15 
years later. Based on the above review, we derived the following three expectations from 
a conception of authoritarianism as a personality trait: 
1) Due to the age of this sample, authoritarianism should show higher levels of 
rank-order stability than it did in younger samples; 
2) This stability should be primarily genetic in origin; 
3) Genetic influences will contribute primarily to stability and not to change, 
while nonshared environmental influences will contributions both to stability 
and to change 
To the extent that these expectations are met, the conception of authoritarianism as a 
personality trait will have been supported. 
IV.2 Methods 
IV.2.1 Participants and Measures 
 Participants were members of the Minnesota Twin Registry (MTR), a birth-record 
based registry of twin pairs born in Minnesota described at length by Krueger and 
Johnson (2002). The present study assessed those members of the registry who were 
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members of same-sex twin pairs born between 1947 and 1955, who completed two 
assessments of interest.  
IV.2.1.1 Assessment 1 
 As described in greater detail by McCourt et al. (1999), 2,800 MTR participants 
completed the 1986 version of the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988) between 1990 and 
1993. Participants used a nine-category Likert response format to provide responses to 30 
items assessing the three facets of the authoritarianism construct put forward by 
Altemeyer: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. An 
example item representing all three of these facets is “Our country will be great if we 
honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the 
‘rotten apples’ who are ruining everything.” The alpha reliability of the measure was .94. 
At this time, participants also indicated the years of education they had achieved. Of the 
participants included in the present analysis (those who completed both assessment 1 and 
assessment 2), the median participant had completed two years of post-secondary 
education (Mean = 14.31, SD = 2.31, range 10 – 21).  
IV.2.1.2. Assessment 2 
 A comprehensive assessment of political attitudes was performed in 2008 and 
2009 on MTR participants born between 1947 and 1955, as described in detail by Funk et 
al. (2012). The assessment included Zariksson’s (2005) abbreviated form of Altemeyer’s 
RWA measure, which assesses 15 items with a seven-category Likert response format. 
Though these items are thematically highly similar to Altemeyer’s (1988) measure, no 
items were exactly identical, preventing a meaningful comparison of mean-levels 
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between the two assessments. 1,327 participants completed this assessment, including 
540 (53% female) who completed Assessment 1. This included 131 MZ twin pairs and 86 
DZ twin pairs, where members of an additional 45 MZ and 49 DZ twin pairs provided 
complete information at one assessment with only one member of the pair completed the 
other assessment. The alpha reliability of this measure was .87. 
IV.2.2 Analysis 
 Twin models make use of the differences in the genetic similarities between MZ 
and DZ twin pairs to quantify the relative contributions of genetic and environmental 
factors to a given phenotype. This typically involves decomposing phenotypic variance 
into variance due to additive genetic effects (a2: the summed contribution of genes across 
loci) as well as shared (c2) and nonshared (e2) environmental effects. Shared 
environmental effects produce similarity between twin pairs regardless of zygosity, while 
nonshared environmental effects produce uniqueness among members of a twin pair. 
Measurement error and state fluctuations are also represented as nonshared 
environmental effects. 
  We used a Cholesky model to estimate the biometric contributions to RWA at 
each time point as well as the extent to which these contributions are consistent over 
time. A simplified version of this model is presented in Figure 1. This model also allowed 
us to estimate the extent to which genetic and environmental variance at Time 2 is shared 
with Time 1 (indicating stable influence over time), or is instead unique to Time 2 
(indicating it is responsible for change). We fit our models to the raw data using Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood, which provides efficient and consistent estimates in 
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the presence of missing data (Little & Rubin, 1987). The assumptions required for the use 
of this model on twin data are discussed more fully in Johnson (2007). One issue of 
particular importance concerns the presence of assortative mating, which can provide a 
downward bias to heritability estimates if not accounted for in the model. Previous work 
on this sample (McCourt et al., 1999) and others (Martin et al., 1986) has demonstrated 
the importance of assortative mating for sociopolitical attitudes. Based on the results of 
McCourt et al. (1999), we incorporated an assortative mating coefficient of .4 into our 
model. 
IV.3 Results 
IV.3.1 Phenotypic stability 
 Phenotypic stability for RWA was very high, with Time 1 and Time 2 scores 
correlating .74 (95% confidence interval: .71 - .77). This stability was particularly 
pronounced among the more educated segment of the sample. Among those with 14 or 
more years of education (N=285), the correlation between Time 1 and Time 2 scores was 
.78, significantly higher than the correlation of .64 among those with 13 or fewer years of 
education (N=240; p <.001). The more educated portion of the sample tended to exhibit 
more consistent responses within a given assessment: alphas were higher for Time 1 and 
Time 2 for the more educated sample (.95 and .90, respectively) than for the less 
educated sample (.90 and .80, respectively). However, these differences in reliability 
could not account for the greater stability: after correcting for attenuation due to 
measurement error, the correlation between Time 1 and Time 2 scores was still 
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significantly (p < .01) higher among the more educated portion of the sample (r = .84) 
than among the less educated (r = .76).  
The correlation between authoritarianism at Time 2 and years of education was -
.38 (p < .001), consistent both with previously reported results using the Time 1 
assessment of this sample as well as results from a recent meta-analysis (McCourt et al., 
1999; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). An individual selecting the neutral (central) 
response for each question from the Time 2 assessment would obtain a score of 60; the 
mean score among the less educated group (64.26; sd = 14.20) indicated a significant 
tendency to provide authoritarian-leaning responses (p < .001), while the more educated 
group (53.72, sd = 17.87) tended to endorse slightly nonauthoritarian views (p < .001), 
though the variance was significantly greater in the more educated sample (p < .001). 
IV.3.2 Biometric results 
Results from Table 1 indicate that MZ twin pairs were more similar to each other 
than were members of DZ twin pairs, pointing to the importance of genetic factors for 
authoritarianism. Cross-twin, cross-time correlations were obtained by correlating the 
Time 1 scores of one member of a twin pair with the Time 2 scores of the other member 
of the pair. MZ twins are more similar to each other over time than are DZ twins, 
indicating the presence of genetic influence on the stability of RWA over time. 
Results from the Cholesky model (presented in Table 2) provide a comparable 
pattern of results as that derived from the twin correlations. Additive genetic variance 
accounted for roughly half of the variance at each assessment, with nonshared 
environment accounting for most of the remainder. Consistent with research on other 
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personality traits (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005), genetic factors accounted for 58% of the 
stability over time in RWA, with lesser roles played by the shared and nonshared 
environment. Finally, the genetic contributions to Time 1 RWA overlapped completely 
with genetic contributions to Time 2 RWA, indicating that the modest amount of rank-
order change in RWA during this time period was not due to genetic factors. A similar 
result was observed for shared environmental effects. In contrast, nonshared 
environmental contributions to Time 1 variance overlap only moderately (.36) with 
contributions to Time 2 variance.  
IV.4 Discussion 
Our results were consistent with the conception of authoritarianism as a highly 
stable personality trait. While our use of different measures of authoritarianism at the two 
assessments might be expected to attenuate the correlation between them, we 
nevertheless observed a very high degree of rank-order stability, with a correlation of .74 
over a 15 year interval. This is identical to the expected 10-year stability of .74 for 
personality traits for adults in their 50s reported by Roberts et al. (2006). This stability 
was significantly greater among the more educated members of our sample, supporting 
Krosnick and Alwin’s (1989) hypothesis that advanced education leads to a solidification 
of attitudes. As Altemeyer’s (1996) work on the long-term stability of authoritarianism 
had relied exclusively on student samples, it may provide overestimates of the stability of 
the trait in the population at large during young adulthood. 
This study also provided the first genetically-informative longitudinal study of 
authoritarianism. We found that rank-order changes in authoritarianism derived from 
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nonshared environmental factors, while genetic influences were the primary contributor 
to rank-order stability in the phenotype. That is, phenotypic stability was primarily due to 
genetic factors (a2 = .58). These results are consistent with those reported in a study of a 
portion of the present sample in which personality was assessed twice over a five-year 
interval with the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ: Tellegen & Waller, 
2008): Johnson et al. (2005) reported that genetic factors contributed nearly exclusively 
to stability and not change, with nonshared environment contributing to both stability and 
change. Thus, while both authoritarianism and the MPQ traits have been observed to be 
highly stable over time, with genetics accounting for much of that stability, the changes 
that did occur in scores for these measures reflected both measurement error and the 
unique experiences of the individual. 
Longitudinal twin studies using the MPQ are particularly useful for evaluating 
how authoritarianism’s stability and biometric basis compare to that of other personality 
traits, as the MPQ Traditionalism scale is highly comparable to Altemeyer’s 
authoritarianism measure (Ludeke, Johnson, & Bouchard, 2013). Consistent with the 
conceptualization of authoritarianism and related characteristics as personality traits, two 
recent studies showed that the phenotypic stability of Traditionalism was similar to that 
observed for other MPQ traits (Blonigen et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2005). At the same 
time, the unique environment may be less important for authoritarianism and related traits 
than for other personality traits: twin correlations for authoritarianism in this study and 
for the Traditionalism scale in Johnson et al. (2005) were at the high end of what has 
been reported for personality traits (reviewed by Johnson, Vernon, & Feiler, 2008), and 
estimates for the unique environment were significantly smaller for Traditionalism than 
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for most other MPQ traits in Blonigen et al. (2008). This result may be substantive rather 
than simply reflecting the role of measurement error, given that the reliability for 
Traditionalism is comparable to other MPQ scales (whether assessed with Cronbach’s 
Alpha or with 30-day test-retest correlations; Johnson et al., 2005). Rather than being a 
mutable characteristic that is highly responsive to the experiences of the individual, then, 
authoritarianism and related traits may be particularly effective exemplars of stable traits 
unaffected by the individual’s unique experiences.  
Efforts to resolve the current dispute over the nature of authoritarianism require 
attention not only to results such as those presented here, but also an eye towards 
contemporary conceptions of personality traits.  
In particular, a recognition of the susceptibility of personality traits to 
environmental influence (Roberts et al., 2006) indicates that the moderate mean-level 
changes indicated by other studies of authoritarianism are not inconsistent with a trait 
conception of the construct. For example, the observation that moderate decreases in 
traits such as negative emotionality accompany occupational success has not prompted 
any dispute over negative emotionality’s status as a personality trait (Roberts, Caspi, & 
Moffitt, 2003). Similarly, if the participants in Duckitt and Fisher’s (2003) study were 
correct in hypothesizing that their authoritarianism scores would moderately increase 
should society descend into chaos, this is best seen as yet another example of how an 
individual’s personality traits may undergo predictable shifts in response to changes in 
his environment – not as a challenge to authoritarianism’s status as a trait. At the same 
time, the demonstration that authoritarianism exhibits a high degree of genetically-
influenced stability does not trivialize those changes in authoritarianism that do occur, 
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particularly given the societal implications of such changes. For example, citizens of 
European states hit particularly hard by the recent global economic crisis have shown 
increased sympathy for authoritarian governments (Berglof, 2011), where this shift has 
been accompanied by corresponding election results and political movements in many of 
the affected nations. Thus, while authoritarianism may be no more malleable than any 
other personality trait, the identification of contributors to change in the trait remains a 
particularly urgent project deserving of continued attention in future research. 
Future research is also needed to address other arguments against the trait 
conception of authoritarianism. In particular, the extent to which the effects of 
authoritarianism on behavior are “invariant across situations” (Sibley et al., 2007; p. 367) 
should be compared to the extent to which the effects of traits like extraversion on 
behavior may be affected by situational context. With regard to authoritarianism, 
although it is generally linked to greater rates of intergroup bias (Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 
Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselare, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009), this effect can be intensified 
when individuals have recently considered a range of threatening scenarios, including 
their death, property loss to burglary, and the prospect of social isolation (Navarrete, 
Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004). That is, the effect of authoritarianism on 
outcomes of interest may be exaggerated or muted based on other factors. 
Of course, moderators of the effects of conventional personality traits have long 
been known. For example, the effects of extraversion can be suppressed or exaggerated 
by the nature of a social interaction: Monson and colleagues (1982) reported that when 
participants were either actively solicited to socialize or actively discouraged from 
socializing, extraversion was not predictive of talkativeness, whereas in a neutral 
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condition lacking both solicitation and discouragement, extraversion was significantly 
predictive of talkativeness. There is thus nothing about the demonstration that a given 
characteristic has non-uniform expression across different situations that threatens its 
status as a personality trait. Indeed, as Tellegen and Waller (2008) note, traits “are 
emphatically not construed as generalized ‘situation-free’ action tendencies, but as 
tendencies to behave in certain ways in certain situations” (p. 262). 
Rather than expecting, as Sibley et al. (2007) appear to, that personality has 
wholly unconditional effects on behavior, we might expect that the trait in question 
simply leads to a consistent direction of effect given a particular class of situations. This 
criterion would still be quite stringent – for example, it would require that no context 
should be sufficient to cause extraverts to socialize less than introverts without 
challenging the meaningfulness of “extraversion” as a trait. In the case of 
authoritarianism, its effects could be argued to be unconditional if authoritarians show 
consistently greater tendencies to submit to authorities they recognize as legitimate. To 
sustain a challenge to authoritarianism’s status as a personality trait on the grounds of the 
purported context-dependent nature of its effects on behavior, researchers might explore 
whether there are any contexts that make authoritarians more willing than 
nonauthoritarians to rebel against authorities perceived to be legitimate. 
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Table 1.  Associations of trait desirability with 
personality and self-criterion residuals in student 
sample 
  
Trait Desirability 
    O C E A ES 
Self-Report 
O .64 -.14 .00 .03 -.11 
C -.12 .65 .03 .03 -.15 
E -.09 -.15 .62 .05 -.14 
A -.01 .00 -.01 .66 -.07 
ES -.06 -.15 .03 -.04 .44 
Peer-Report 
O .32 -.05 -.07 .12 .01 
C -.06 .36 .01 .03 -.06 
E -.03 .02 .27 -.08 .02 
A .00 -.02 .00 .27 .12 
ES -.03 -.08 .00 -.08 .33 
Self-Criterion 
Residuals 
O .55 -.13 .04 -.03 -.12 
C -.11 .55 .03 .02 -.13 
E -.08 -.17 .56 .09 -.17 
A .00 .01 -.01 .60 -.12 
ES -.06 -.12 .04 .00 .33 
Note: Each value is a correlation across 176 targets of 
their ratings of the desirability of a trait with trait-
levels as indicated by self- and by peer-report as well 
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as with self-criterion residuals for a trait.  Predicted 
relationships are in bold, and are all significant at p < 
.001. Unpredicted relationships significant at p < .05 
(uncorrected for multiple testing) are in italics. O = 
Openness/Intellect, C = Conscientiousness, E = 
Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, ES = Emotional 
Stability.  
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Table 2. Associations of trait desirability with trait levels and 
self-criterion residuals in adult community sample 
  
Trait Desirability 
  
O C E A ES Attract 
Self-Report 
O .51 -.10 -.03 -.05 .00 .01 
C -.09 .34 -.02 .03 -.04 -.05 
E -.05 .00 .27 -.01 -.01 -.08 
A -.04 -.05 .07 .40 -.14 -.07 
ES .04 .01 .01 -.09 .22 .05 
Attract .01 -.08 .15 -.02 .10 .13 
Peer-Report 
O .40 -.18 -.04 -.02 .07 -.02 
C -.10 .21 -.05 .05 -.03 -.04 
E -.08 -.04 .27 .00 .01 -.09 
A -.02 -.08 .03 .22 -.04 .02 
ES .01 .04 -.01 -.09 .09 .09 
Attract .00 -.06 .03 .18 .03 .06 
Self-Criterion 
Residuals 
O .35 .00 -.01 -.05 -.05 .02 
C -.05 .28 .01 .01 -.03 -.03 
E .00 .03 .13 -.01 -.03 -.03 
A -.04 -.02 .06 .34 -.14 -.08 
ES .04 -.01 .02 -.06 .20 .01 
Attract .01 -.06 .14 -.08 .09 .11 
Note: Each value is a correlation across 541 targets of their ratings of 
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the desirability of a trait with trait-levels as indicated by self- and by 
peer-report as well as with self-criterion residuals for a trait. O = 
Openness/Intellect, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion,  A = 
Agreeableness, ES = Emotional Stability, Attract = Physical 
Attractiveness. Predicted relationships are in bold. All associations of  
.13 or greater are significant at .001; all associations of .08 or greater 
are significant at p < .05 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons). 
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Table 3.  Intelligence: Associations Between Desirability, 
Trait Levels, and Self-Criterion Residuals (SCRs) 
 
Desirability 
Self-
rating 
Peer-
rating 
Self-rating 0.48     
Peer-rating 0.38 0.53 
 Cattell 0.41 0.34 0.39 
SCR - Peer 0.33 X X 
SCR - Cattell 0.35 X 0.42 
SCR - Peer & Cattell 0.27 X X 
Note: Cells are marked with an X if one variable was used 
to compute the other. All values are significant at p < .001. 
Cattell = Cattell's Factor B.  
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Table 4.  Correlations of the BIDR scales with self-criterion residuals 
  Impression 
Management 
Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement 
  
Self-
Criterion 
Residuals 
Openness/Intellect -.02 .13 
Conscientiousness .16 .32 
Extraversion .02 .09 
Agreeableness .28 .05 
Emotional Stability .30 .39 
Attractiveness -.07 .07 
IQ .00 .12 
Note: Associations in bold are significant at p < .01, associations in 
italics are significant at p < .05 (uncorrected for multiple testing).  
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Table 5. Overclaiming Predicted in 
Multiple Regression Using BIDR Scales 
and Trait Desirability 
  
Beta Sig 
 
IM -.06 .168 
O SDE .15 .001 
  Desirability .37 .000 
  IM .00 .963 
C SDE .29 .000 
  Desirability .24 .000 
  IM .00 .934 
E SDE .08 .084 
  Desirability .12 .007 
  IM .24 .000 
A SDE .00 .913 
  Desirability .31 .000 
  IM .20 .000 
ES SDE .29 .000 
  Desirability .17 .000 
  IM -.10 .044 
Attract SDE .11 .017 
  Desirability .09 .037 
  IM -.07 .183 
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IQ SDE .14 .004 
  Desirability .26 .000 
Note: Participant scores for self-criterion 
residuals for each trait were predicted 
simultaneously by the BIDR scales and 
the participant's rating of the desirability 
of this trait. IM = Impression 
Management, SDE = Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement, O = Openness/Intellect, C 
= Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A 
= Agreeableness, ES = Emotional 
Stability, Attract = Physical 
Attractiveness.  
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Table 6. Correlations of sociopolitical 
attitudes with personality, self-criterion 
residuals, and trait desirability ratings 
 
 
RWA SDO 
Self-ratings 
A .01 -.30 
C .12 -.05 
O -.38 -.10 
IQ -.35 -.06 
Peer-ratings 
A .02 -.19 
C .06 -.03 
O -.35 -.19 
Objective IQ -.36 -.03 
Self-Criterion 
Residuals 
A .00 -.23 
C .10 -.04 
O -.22 .01 
IQ -.24 -.07 
Desirability  
A .06 -.39 
C .33 .20 
O -.47 -.21 
IQ -.42 -.18 
Note: Values in bold are significant at p < .05 
(without adjustment for multiple testing). A = 
Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, O = 
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Openness, IQ = Intelligence. 
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Table 7. Standardized path weights and fit indices from the model in Figure 1    
 
  
True →  
S.A. 
True → 
Des 
S.A. → 
Des 
True → 
Self 
True → 
Crit. 1 
True → 
Crit. 2 
True → 
Crit. 3 
S.A. →  
Self 
Des → 
Self RMSEA CFI   
 
 
C .07 .18* .32** .54** .66** .67** .61** .00 (.09*) .24** .000 1.000 
RWA O  -.42** .31**  -.34** .58* .60** .69** .66**  -.02 (-.11*) .27** .041 .993 
  IQ  -.43** .35**  -.27** .19** .71** .76** .61** -.13* (-.22**) .33** .000 1.000 
SDO A  -.25** .19**  -.34* .52** .61** .53** .57**  -.08 (-.16**) .22** .028 .994 
Note: In the models containing C, O, and A, criterion values are provided by peer reports. In the model containing IQ, criterion 
values are provided by 5 item clusters from Factor B. The value in parentheses represents the path coefficient in the reduced 
model, which omits Trait Desirability. S.A. = Social Attitudes, Des = Desirability, Crit. = Criterion, A = Agreeableness, C = 
Conscientiousness, O = Openness, IQ = Intelligence. ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
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Table 8. Intraclass correlations in authoritarianism scores between members 
of twin pairs 
 
MZ DZ 
 
Time 1 Time 2 CTCT Time 1 Time 2 CTCT 
r .67 .59 .63 .49 .43 .43 
  (.62, .72) (.52, .65) (.57, .68) (.40, .56) (.32, .52) (.34, .50) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent the 95% confidence interval. MZ = 
Monozygotic; DZ = Dizygotic; CTCT = Cross-twin cross-time 
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Table 9. Genetic and environmental contributions to 
authoritarianism 
 
Time 1 Time 2 
T1-T2 
correlation 
Proportion 
of Influence 
on Stability   
A 
.46 .41 1.00 .58 
(.26, .67) (.18, .61) (.87, 1) (.34, .82) 
C 
.22 .19 .93 .25 
(.02, .39) (.00, .39) (.48, 1) (.02, .46) 
E 
.32 .41 .36 .18 
(.28, .37) (.35, .47) (.24, .47) (.11, .24) 
Note: The biometric decomposition of the phenotypic 
covariance between T1 and T2 is represented in the last 
column, which shows that genetic factors account for 
58% of the stability in authoritarianism. Numbers in 
parentheses represent the 95% confidence interval. A = 
additive genetic; C = shared environmental; E = 
nonshared environmental; T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2 
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Figure 1. Mediation model to identify the influence of sociopolitical attitudes on 
overclaiming, by controlling for true trait variance. Parameter values shown are from the 
application of the model to Openness and Right-Wing Authoritarianism; for significance 
tests and parameters from other analyses, see Table 7. The value in parentheses 
represents the path coefficient in the reduced model, which omits Trait Desirability.  
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Figure 2. A path diagram of an AE Cholesky model for Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(RWA) at Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2). For ease of representation we have omitted 
shared environmental effects and represented only one member of a twin pair. In this 
model the variance at each time point is decomposed into additive genetic (A1, A2) and 
nonshared environmental effects (E1, E2). a11 and e11 represent additive genetic and 
nonshared environmental contributions to the Time 1 phenotype, respectively; a21 and e21 
represent additive genetic and unique environmental contributions connecting the Time 1 
and the Time 2 phenotypes, respectively; a22 and e22 represent residual additive genetic 
and nonshared environmental contributions to the Time 2 phenotype, respectively. 
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